Beschreibung
In 2001, goodwill amortization in the US was eliminated in favor of an impairment-only approach, which, according to critics, gives managers vast discretion and opportunities for earnings management. Prior research suggests that discretionary asset write-offs are associated with economic factors and managers’ financial reporting objectives. Based on a systematic literature review, this study investigates for a comprehensive sample of US firms the determinants of goodwill write-off behavior. Regression analysis shows that write-off behavior is significantly explained by firms’ economic properties. Only in large, high-profile firms, incentives appear to be significant determinants. These findings suggest that the impairment-only approach does capture goodwill impairment at least to some extent.
Autorenportrait
The Author: Thorsten Sellhorn, born in 1973 in Bochum, studied Economics and Business Administration from 1993-1997 at the University of Bochum. Subsequently, he joined the University of Wisconsin-Madison School of Business on a Fulbright scholarship. In 1998, he graduated with a Master of Business Administration (MBA) degree. Since 1999, he has been working as a research assistant at the Chair of International Accounting at the University of Bochum. The author was awarded the doctorate degree in 2004. He is now a postdoctoral researcher at this institution.
