Beschreibung
InhaltsangabePreface.- 1: A Vocabulary of Ignorance.- 1.1 Ignoring Ignorance.- 1.2 A Framework for Ignorance.- 1.3 The Rest of this Book.- I: Normative Paradigms.- 2: Full Belief and the Pursuit of Certainty.- 2.1 Ignorance: The Views from Dogmatism and Skepticism.- 2.2 Examples of Traditional Normative Pragmatism.- 2.3 The Ultimate Mental Health Project.- 3: Probability and the Cultivation of Uncertainty.- 3.1 Probabilists as Strategists.- 3.2 Definitions of Cultivatable Uncertainty.- 3.3 Classical Theory and the Unifying Impulse.- 3.4 Relative Frequency Theory: Banishing the Monsters.- 3.5 Subjective Probability and the New Imperialists.- 3.6 Neoclassicism and the Logical Probabilists.- 3.7 Nonquantitative Probability.- 3.8 Combining Probability Judgments.- 3.9 Probability and Risk Assessment.- 4: Beyond Probability: New Normative Paradigms.- 4.1 The Modern Managerial Approach to Ignorance.- 4.2 Normative and Pragmatic Objections to Probability.- 4.3 The New Uncertainties.- 4.3.1 The Certainty Factors Debate.- 4.3.2 Fuzzy Sets, Vagueness, and Ambiguity.- 4.3.3 Possibility and Belief.- 4.4 The Leap to Second-Order Relations 125 4.4.1 Probability of Probabilities, Saith the Preacher.- 4.4.2 Rough Sets, Shaferian Belief, and Possibility Theory.- 4.4.3 Measures of Uncertainty.- 4.5 Imposing Order on the New Chaos.- 4.5.1 The Probabilists' Rejoinders.- 4.5.2 Reductionists: Logic, Topoi, and Probability Again.- 4.5.3 Pluralists and Synthesists.- 4.6 A Normative Paradigm Shift?.- II: Descriptive and Explanatory Paradigms.- 5: Psychological Accounts: Biases, Heuristics, and Control.- 5.1 The Normative View from Psychology.- 5.1.1 Three Traditions.- 5.1.2 Coping, Defending, and Ignorance.- 5.1.3 The Control and Predictability Thesis.- 5.2 The Bayesian Inquisition.- 5.2.1 A Paradigm for Studying Statistical Intuitions.- 5.2.2 From Words to Numbers and Vice-Versa.- 5.2.3 Selective Attention to Evidence.- 5.2.4 Aggregation and the Conjunction Effect.- 5.2.5 Randomicity and the Illusion of Control.- 5.2.6 Reframing Biases and the Independence Axiom.- 5.2.7 Normative Violations: Is the Evidence Clearcut?.- 5.3 Explaining Human Heuristics.- 5.3.1 Availability, Relevance, and Specificity.- 5.3.2 Representativeness, Anchoring, and Adjustment 18.- 5.3.3 Nonstandard Decision Theories.- 5.3.4 Criticisms of the Explanations.- 5.4 New Directions and New Uncertainties.- 5.4.1 Fuzzy Set Theory as a Behavioral Science?.- 5.4.2 Vagueness and Ambiguity.- 5.4.3 The New Reductionists.- 5.5 The Rationality Debate.- 5.5.1 The Bayesians and Rival Rationalists.- 5.5.2 The Normative and the Descriptive.- 6: The Social Construction of Ignorance.- 6.1 The View from Social Science.- 6.2 Ignorance and the Sociology of Knowledge.- 6.3 Ignorance in the Micro-Order.- 6.3.1 Language, Politeness, and Ignorance.- 6.3.2 Norms Inhibiting Communication.- 6.3.3 Privacy, Secrecy, and the Valuation of Information.- 6.3.4 Problems and Limitations.- 6.4 Ignorance in Organizational Life 23.- 6.4.1 Definitions of Uncertainty and Related Concepts.- 6.4.2 Uncertainty, Organizational Structure, and Process.- 6.4.3 Creating and Using Ignorance in Organizations.- 6.5 Coda: Ignorance and the Sociology of Science 25.- 7: A Dialog with Ignorance.- 7.1 The New Preoccupation with Ignorance.- 7.1.1 Techno-Rational Explanations.- 7.1.2 The Stage Model and Motivational Accounts.- 7.1.3 The Deviancy Analogy 27.- 7.2 An Example of a Normative-Descriptive Dialog: The Study of Second-Order Uncertainty.- 7.2.1 The Normative versus the Descriptive 27.- 7.2.2 A Study of Preference Patterns 27.- 7.2.3 Framing Effects in Nonprobabilistic Uncertainty.- 7.2.4 Expanding the Dialog 28.- 7.3 What Goals Are Served by Which 290 Normative Frameworks?.- 7.4 The Social Nature of Rationality.- Name Index.
